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Visual Perception: Bizarre Contours Go Against the Odds A new study shows that the brain sometimes invents visual contours even when they would be highly unlikely to occur in the real world. This presents a challenge to theories assuming that the brain prefers the most probable interpretation of the retinal image.
Roland W. Fleming
How does the brain work out what is in our surroundings from the information on the retina? It's a question that has baffled scientists and philosophers for over a thousand years [1] . The key problem is that the retinal image is fundamentally ambiguous. For any given pattern of light that reaches our eyes, there are many possible scenes that could have created the image. Somehow the brain has to overcome this ambiguity and identify the one true state of the world. But how? Most researchers agree it would generally be a good idea for the brain to select the most probable interpretation of the image. However, as reported recently in Current Biology, Anderson et al. [2] have found that this is not what the brain always does.
Anderson et al. [2] created a motion display that causes the brain to 'invent' surface boundaries where none exist in the image. That in itself is not new: so-called 'illusory contours' have been discussed extensively since the Gestalt psychologists [3] [4] [5] . But here's the catch. Usually, illusory contours are the brain's way of rationally explaining the sudden disappearance of some feature or object. In our natural environment, when something in the retinal image ends abruptly, shrinks or disappears, one of the most likely explanations is that it is being hidden from view by some other surface, a so-called 'occluder'. When this occluder happens to match the background (in other words, when it is camouflaged) then the occluder itself produces no visible contrasts in the image. And this is why the brain creates illusory contours: it knows that the most probable explanation of the disappearing features is that something (which cannot itself be seen) is hiding them.
In the displays created by Anderson et al. [2] , however, we experience vivid illusory contours even though the occluding surface is already clearly visible. In the centre of the display is a clearly visible square occluder. Surrounding the square, four circles oscillate in and out, each one nudging behind the square for a period during the motion. When a circle moves behind the square, a portion of it disappears from the image because it is hidden by the square. However, despite the presence of a clearly visible occluder that can fully account for the disappearance of circles' edges, observers experience an additional illusory contour that bulges and flexes over the top of the square. This is surprising because there is no rational reason for the brain to invent an additional occluder. The explanation for the missing parts of the circles is already visible, so nothing ought to be invented.
The authors argue that this finding has important theoretical consequences. There is a long tradition -dating back at least to Helmholtz [6] -of theories that pose perception as a process of 'probabilistic inference'. These theories argue that, because the image is ambiguous, the visual system must somehow select one of multiple -often infinitely many -interpretations. Helmholtz and followers argue that the visual system selects the interpretation that is most probable, given the statistics of the natural environment. The modern formulation of this idea uses Bayesian inference to represent the probabilities of different states of the world and to select the most probable solution [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] .
Anderson et al. [2] argue that, on its own, purely probabilistic inference cannot account for the perception of illusory contours in their displays. As depicted in Figure 1 , the interpretation of two occluding surfaces (one visible directly, one 'invented' through illusory contours) is substantially less probable than the interpretation of a single one (the square that is visible directly). Therefore, as the authors suggest, to explain the existence of this spurious additional contour, theories of vision also need to take into account constraints imposed by how the inferences are implemented in the brain. In particular, they suggest that the mechanisms involved in working out occlusion are not the only ones triggered by their display. Other processes involved in estimating surface transparency also play a role in interpreting displays like these. When these two different mechanisms are brought into conflict, we can experience spurious, improbable percepts, as occurs here, with illusory contours that do not explain anything, but which the brain invents nonetheless.
Might there be some way of expressing this idea of 'conflicting constraints' within a Bayesian theory of the brain? Current theories certainly cannot explain such improbable percepts. However, truly optimal inference would involve the brain selecting the most probable interpretation across all possible conditions. The inference that gets the answer right most of the time, may still select an improbable solution some of the time, because optimal inference is a compromise between being as flexible as possible and always getting the answer right. Put another way, optimal inference is not just finding the most probable parameter values for a single explanation of a limited set of images. Instead, if the brain were truly optimal, explaining the image would also involve 'model selection', that is, choosing which type of explanation is appropriate for the current image.
Modern Bayesian statistical methods provide tools for 'model averaging', in which multiple, qualitatively different explanations of data are combined to select the most probable explanation.
Might this be what the brain is doing [2] . When observers view the motion sequence depicted in (A), we might expect them to experience it as in (B): a single square occluder in front of four circles. However, they actually experience an additional contour, as shown in (C) and (D) (dashed lines). As highlighted in red in (E), this interpretation is highly improbable as it would require two occluding surfaces to cross the edge of the circles at exactly the same points in the image.
here? It is interesting to speculate whether the presence of these bizarre additional illusory contours might make sense in terms of Bayesian model averaging. Indeed, this is not as different from the authors' own explanation as it may sound. Essentially, when multiple models that impose different constraints are brought into conflict, sometimes the globally most probable solution (the solution that gets the right answer most of the time) will produce the 'wrong' answer (a relatively improbable answer) in a specific given case. Thus, as Anderson et al. [2] argue, the presence of the spurious contours results from higher-level constraints than those captured by a single Bayesian model concerned only with contour completion. Developing theories that explain how the brain resolves conflicts between different kinds of explanation will not just shed light on improbable contours. It will also help us to understand the brain's supreme flexibility more generally.
